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Under the Federal Power Act, the Federal Power Commission may
license hydroelectric projects only on the condition that they be "best
adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a
waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign
commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power devel-
opment, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational
purposes .... " The statutory language suggests only the broadest of
guidelines for the agency to decide whether to license a given project.2
In practice, the Commission is often forced to choose between the
electric power that the project will generate and the existing non-
power benefits, such as fish and scenic resources, that the project will
displace.
The FPC seeks to balance the competing power and non-power
considerations by a cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis.3 But
the Commission process has tended to a per se rule by which all
projects with substantial power benefits receive licenses.4 The agency
1. Federal Power Act § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
2. Under the statutory standard, the FPC has considered a continually increasing
number of factors since its inception. In 1920 the criteria were power, flood control, and
navigation. The agency's procedure was also clear-cut. The FIC sent each application
to the Corps of Army Engineers for comments; the Corps' recommendations were usually
followed.
Since World War II, however, the agency has regularly considered the fish problem in
its licensing decisions, and in the past twenty years, the FPC has begun to deal with
pollution and scenic factors. Interview tith Richard Solomon, General Counsel. Federal
Power Commission, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 7, 1966. For agency efforts in recreational
matters, see pp. 121-22 infra.
3. Note, Federal Power Commission Control over River Basin Development, 51 VA. L
Rav. 663, 673 & n.56 (1965).
4. E.g., City of Tacoma, 10 F.P.C. 424 (1951), afjrd sub nora. Washington Dep't of
Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954), where tie
Commission licensed the project, choosing power, flood control, and navigational benefits.
even though they entailed some fish losses, over retention of the stream in its natural state
until economic pressures could force its full utilization. The agency attached conditions
to prevent undue fish losses. In Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 10 F.P.C. 445 (1951), vacated sub
nom. Oregon v. FPC, 211 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1954), reinstated, 349 U.S. 435 (1955), the
Commission licensed and prescribed temporary measures to meet the needs of anadromous
fish during construction of the project and approved permanent facilities for the fish.
The agency opted for an estimated $351,000 annual excess of power benefits over power
cost in preference to an annual value of $177,000 for fish using the river above the dam.
Two 1964 decisions indicate that the FPC may be reducing the priority given to power
expansion. The Commission refused to issue a license in Public Utility District No. 1,
32 F.P.C. 444 (1964), where the area was already adequately served by the Bonneville Dam
(although the project would have reduced rates slightly) and where fish hatcheries might
have been harmed. And in Pacific Northwest Power Co., 31 F.P.C. 247 (1964), af'd sub
nom. Washington Public Power Supply System v. FPC, 358 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 196),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967), the Commission
chose a site on the Snake River which power experts regarded as the less practical of the
two available possibilities, in order to avoid interference with fish runs on the Salmon.
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has attempted to minimize harm to non-power interests by attaching
conditions to the licenses it grants,5 but with one exception, in 1953, it
has never refused to license a project with more than negligible power
benefits on strictly conservationist grounds.0
Two recent cases indicate increasing judicial concern with FPC
protection of non-power interests. In Consolidated Edison Co. (the
Scenic Hudson case), the Commission granted a license to the New
York power utility to build a pumped-storage project at Storm King
mountain.7 The project had aroused the opposition of conservationists,
who objected to the unsightly appearance of the powerhouse in the
Hudson Highlands, the overhead transmission lines that would run
through several neighboring towns, the adverse effects of fishlife at
the site, the destruction of the mountain vegetation, and the opening
of the area to industrialization. After the Commission decision, the
non-power groups appealed to the Second Circuit. The court agreed
that the FPC's licensing task involved more than simple arbitration
among contending pressure groups.
5. The FP0 may not license a project that is uneconomical, but within that limitation
it may place non-power requirements in the license. Interview with Richard Solomon,
General Counsel, Federal Power Commission, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 7, 1966. This is
apparently the FPCs gloss on 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 803(a) (1964); cf. Rumford Falls Power
Co. v. FPC, 355 F.2d 683 (Ist Cir. 1966) (reversing and remanding on other grounds).
The Commission now generally imposes conditions which include a requirement that
the applicant provide fish, wildlife, and recreational facilities "reasonably consistent with
the primary purpose of the project." FPC, Terms and Conditions of License for Con-
structed Project Affecting Navigable Waters of the United States, Form L-3, arts. 15, 17
(1963).
Commission Carver cites a recent case to demonstrate the lengths to which the FP now
goes to promote recreation through license conditions. In one license the agency included
a requirement that the applicant power company insert a provision in a deed transferring
realty to bind the grantee municipality to use of the land for recreational purposes. Inter-
view with John Carver, Jr., Commissioner, Federal Power Commission, in Washington,
D.C., Oct. 28, 1966. That sort of requirement has since been codified as agency policy.
18 C.F.R. § 2.7 (1967).
6. Namekagon Hydro Co., 12 F.P.C. 203 (1953), aff'd, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954). The
Commission decided that the unique recreational features of the river were of greater
public benefit than use of the river for water power development. The proposed project
was a minor one, with a capacity of only 1500 kilowatts; thus the decision sacrificed no
substantial power benefits. One observer has suggested that the license denial was "allowed
through the mill" to pacify a new Commissioner identified as a "birds and bees" man.
Interview with a former Commissioner of the Federal Power Commission, in Washington,
D.C., Oct. 6, 1966. The absence of similar decisions since 1958 tends to support the claim
that Namekagon represented something less than a profound alteration in Commission
policy.
7. 83 F.P.C. 428, rev'd sub noma. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Under the proposed scheme of
operation, the station would pump water from the Hudson to a reservoir in the mountains
west of the river during off-peak periods, usually at night, using electricity generated by
the company's thermal-electric plants. The stored water would return to the river during
peak periods, generating electricity as it passed through the powerhouse at the foot of the
mountain.
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In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed to
be the representative of the public interest. This role does not
permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for
adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public must re-
ceive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the Com-
mission.8
The court reversed the agency decision and remanded for further
hearings to consider "the preservation of natural beauty and of na-
tional historic shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent society,
the cost of a project is only one of several factors to be considered."D
In Udall v. FPG (the High Mountain Sheep case),10 decided last
June, the Supreme Court reiterated and clarified the Scenic Hudson
mandate. Here a dispute had arisen between federal and private de-
velopers of a Snake River dam site. After originally proposing no
development in his recommendation to the FPC, the Secretary of the
Interior reversed himself and intervened to secure development by
his agency. But the FPC granted a license to Pacific Northwest Power
Company, a joint venture of four private companies, holding that the
record failed to show that federal development would be superior in
flood control, power benefits, fish passage, navigation, or recreation.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Mr. Justice Douglas concluded for the
majority:
The test is whether the project will be in the public interest. And
that determination can be made only after an exploration of all
issues relevant to the "public interest," including future power
demand and supply, alternate sources of power, the public interest
in preserving reaches of wild rivers and wilderness areas, the
preservation of anadromous fish for commercial and recreational
purposes, and the protection of wildlife."
In reversing and remanding, the Court implied that the Commission
might now have to deny licenses entirely where non-power considera-
tions so dictate.
[I]f... this additional dam would destroy the waterway as spawn-
ing grounds for anadromous fish . . . or seriously impair that
function, the project is put in an entirely different light. The
importance of salmon and steelheads in our outdoor life as well
8. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
9. 354 F.2d at 624.
10. 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
11. Id. at 450.
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as in commerce is so great that there certainly comes a time when
their destruction might necessitate a halt in so-called "improve-
ment" or "development" of waterways. 12
The decisions in Scenic Hudson and High Mountain Sheep dem-
onstrate that the FPC must now take non-power interests fully into
account in licensing hydroelectric projects, and consider denying
applications on non-power grounds when appropriate," To winnow
out the appropriate cases, however, an important underlying problem
must be solved: that of insuring an adequate presentation of non-
power interests to the Commission. Several factors militate against a
balanced exposition. The agency itself, not unlike others, tends to
involve itself with the industry it regulates. Naturally enough, the
FPC wishes to support sound economic projects and a rapid expansion
of the industry; unfortunately, non-power interests, unless carefully
nurtured, may suffer as a result. Other governmental agencies may
help, but their protection of non-power interests suffers frequently
from a lack of resources and occasionally from the fact that they have
hatchets of their own to sharpen. The Scenic Hudson case showed that
private groups may do much to represent the public interest. But they
too have their limitations. The typical conservation organization op.
erates on an annual budget of about $350,000, and with perhaps 25
staff members.14 Often the office and travel expenses, combined with
modest salaries, more than exhaust the treasury. By the time of the
rehearing in Scenic Hudson, the conservationists had already spent
almost $250,000-an astounding sum for such an organization to
amass, and a feat rarely, if ever, to be repeated. 1 At the same stage
12. Id. at 437.
13. This is not to suggest that the administrative ideal of regulation in the "public
interest" is attainable, or that it is anything more than a myth concealing the fact that
the agency is making value choices and policy decisions. It is merely to argue that by
getting as much information as possible from non-power interests and giving them maxi.
mum procedural protection, the FPC can increase pressure on itself towards making other
than the traditional choice in favor of power, to the detriment, if not to the total
destruction, of non-power interests. See generally Reich, The Law of the Planned Sociely,
75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
14. Interview with Dr. Walter Boardman, former Executive Director, Nature Con-
servancy, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 27, 1966.
15. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1966, at 86, col. 3. A witness for Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference at the rehearing indicated how deceptive the notion of an "inexpensive inter-
vention" has proved to be:
There are those who may think that we can well afford to oppose the Storm Xing
project. But that is not the case. At this very moment [Nov. 14, 19661, our indebted.
ness possibly exceeds $100,000. What with the hearings, this indebtedness will vastly
increase, without ... any promise that these debts will ever be met. Commissioner
Ross spoke in his dissenting opinion of "the poorly organized and poorly financed
public." Perhaps by this time there is some degree of organization; but I do not
believe that even Commissioner Ross could imagine what a desperate financial situa-
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in the proceedings, Con Edison had spent an estimated $14 million
on the project. The problem of relative resources is crucial; it becomes
more severe in cases that do not rise to the status of a "conservation
cause celebre of national scope." '
Proper procedural and structural devices can do much to eliminate
the natural tendency toward under-representation of non-power in-
terests before the FPC. Such changes in existing practices should
strengthen the potential role of each participant in the process which
may protect non-power interests-the agency staff, the Commission
itself, the public, and other governmental agencies. Before an explora-
tion of the possible ways to enhance protection of non-power interests
can be embarked upon, however, the present licensing process should
be described as background.
I. Non-Power Interests in the Current FFC Licensing Process
Each power company seeking a project license must file with its
application additional information describing the possible non-power
costs or benefits of the proposed project.' 7 Within the past four years,
the Commission has developed or amended three such exhibit require-
ments. Exhibit R is a recreational plan to enable the Commission to
determine whether the recreational potential of the natural resources
to be devoted to licensed projects will be adequately developed, con-
sistent with power development and other public purposes, in com-
pliance with the directive in § 10(a) of the Federal Power Act. 8
tion we at Scenic Hudson find ourselves in ....
Were it not for those so many who have given their time freely, who are willing
to go fonard upon expectation only and their conviction that this is an honorable
cause, we could not be here. And even then, we have not been able to summon
many of the experts that we had wished. We have simply not had the funds.
Statement of Alexander Saunders, Record, vol. 35, at 5638, 5640-41, Consolidated Edison
Co., 33 F.P.C. 428 (1965).
16. N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1966, at 86, col. 3.
17. The licensing process begins with the filing of an application for either a license
or a preliminary permit. The FPC issues the latter to enable applicants to secure the
information that must accompany the license application. Which procedure the applicant
will use depends on his preferential status; a non-preferred party may go the preliminar)-
permit route to achieve some security in light of the money he is spending to complete
his application. Federal Power Act §§ 4(e)-(f), 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e)-(i) (1964).
Non-power parties seeking to intervene to oppose a project at the prclininar) -permit
stage will almost invariably be told to come back when the license application is filed.
But if they want a potential licensee to take action to foster their objectives, tiey can
sometimes get the Commission to insert permit conditions at the preliminary-project stage
requiring study of various non-power aspects of comprehensive development, often in
consultation with the complainant or federal or state authorities in the field.
18. 18 C.F.R. § 4.41 (1967). To give Exhibit R some practical value to the public, the
Commission added to its Regulations Part 8, "Publication of License Conditions Relating
to Recreation." 18 C.F.R. § 8.1 (1967).
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Exhibit K, which limits project boundaries to 200 feet around the
installation, has been amended to exempt lands "necessary or appro-
priate for recreation purposes, for which it is recognized that addi-
tional project area will generally be required .. ..",9 The Commis-
sion's Exhibit K language is merely permissive but may encourage
applicants to expand their recreational facilities as they come to recog-
nize the attendant public-relations benefits.20 Finally, Exhibit S re-
quires the applicant to "report on the effect, if any, of the project
upon the fish and wildlife resources in the project area or in other
areas affected by the project and proposals for measures considered
to conserve and, if practicable, to enhance fish and wildlife resources
affected by the project."21
Primary responsibility for handling the license application rests with
an assigned staff counsel, who identifies the relevant issues and pre-
pares the agency case. The non-power exhibits go to the Section of
Recreation, Fish and Wildlife in the Division of Licensed Projects.22
There a staff headed by a fishery biologist assisted by three recreation
resource specialists evaluates the applicant's recreational plans and
the project's likely effects on fish and game to determine whether the
proposed installation complies with Commission requirements. 2,3 The
staff then weighs the cost of the non-power facilities against the bene-
fits they will confer. Finally, the Section forwards its recommendations
to the Applications Section of the Bureau of Power for consideration
in the Bureau memorandum. 24
19. 18 C.F.R. § 4.41 (1967). In promulgating the Exhibit K amendment, the FPC Issued
an accompanying policy statement designed to promote recreational development at
existing and future licensed projects. 30 Fed. Reg. 16,197-98 (1965). Along with tile
statement, the agency gave out a "Report on Criteria and Standards for Outdoor Recrea-
tion Development at Hydroelectric Projects," which it encouraged licensees and future
applicants to use in order to obtain full utilization of project lands and waters consistent
with area outdoor recreation needs for the present and immediate future.
20. Interview with Joseph Swidler, former Chairman, Federal Power Commisaion, in
Washington, D.C., Oct. 27, 1966.
21. 31 Fed. Reg. 8780 (1966). The Exhibit requires the applicant to cooperate with
state and federal fish agencies before he files his application, so that they will have time
to deal with the forms once they come in.
22. A copy goes to the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation of the Department of Interior,
as well as to the FPC regional office, which makes an on-site inspection for engineering
and recreation purposes. If local interests are involved in the application, copies are also
sent to the appropriate county or city. Interview with Richard Solomon, General Counsel,
Federal Power Commission, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 7, 1966.
23. This program is still in its infancy. The Section Chief joined the Commission In
March, 1963, as a fishery biologist and was made head of the Section in July, 1965, when
it was formed. The recreational staff came into being in June, 1963. Interview with
Forrest Hauck, Chief, Section of Recreation, Fish and Wildlife, Federal Power Commisslon,
in Washington, D.C., Oct. 7, 1966.
24. Interview with M. Frank Thomas, Chief, Division of Licensed Projects, Federal
Power Commission, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 28, 1966.
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During the investigation, the agency attorney and the applicant
attempt to settle differences by negotiation before the formal hearing.
The applicant is likely to comply with modifications recommended by
the staff, since the counsel's later support may be crucial in deter-
mining whether the Commission will grant the license. If the applicant
yields far enough at the preliminary stage, he may be able to reduce
the hearing, if one is held, to a pure formality.
Since neither the Administrative Procedure Act nor the Federal
Power Act requires a hearing, the decision whether to have one rests
with Commission discretion.2 5 If the Commission decides to hold a
hearing, it issues a "hearing order" outlining the scope of the pro-
ceeding and setting a deadline for petitions to intervene.201 The Federal
Power Act permits the Commission to admit as a party any interested
state, state commission, municipality, representative of consumers,
security holders or competitors, or "any other person whose partici-
pation in the proceeding may be in the public interest."2 7 The FPC
generally recognizes the right of organizations representing non-power
interests to intervene in licensing cases.
The staff counsel and the parties have already submitted their direct
evidence in the form of prepared testimony and exhibits before the
hearing opens. The staff position in the case, as it evolves to its final
form in the briefs submitted after the hearing, emerges from discus-
sion among all the FPC personnel working on the case. But the staff
counsel, speaking as the primary authority within the agency, is in-
dependent of the professional and technical staff in the Bureau of
Power. At the hearing, the Section of Recreation, Fish, and Wildlife
occupies a rather peripheral position. Its chief may participate as a
witness; he usually sits in on relevant sessions; and during the hearing
he may advise the staff counsel on technical matters28
25. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5, 9, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1004, 1008 (1964). The Federal
Power Act § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 797 (1964), the licensing authorization, contains no explicit
requirement of a hearing prior to a licensing decision, nor does an) other provision of the
Act. The Regulations that the FPC has promulgated under the Act state that a "hearing
upon an application may be ordered by the Commission, in its discretion, either upon
its own motion or upon the motion of any party in interest." 18 C.F.R. § 4.32 (1967.
26. The usual practice is to avoid specifying the issues in the hearing order, on the
theory that any saving in time from a detailed ruling would be offset by elaborate
pleadings forcing a return of the entire case to the Commission for decision on the scope
of the proceedings. Interview with Richard Solomon, General Counsel, Federal Power
Commission, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 7, 1966.
27. Federal Power Act § 308(a), 16 U.S.C. § 825(g)(a) (1964); ef. 18 C.F.R. § 1.8 (1967).
28. The Section Chief was not a witness in the original Consolidated Edison hearing.
but observed the proceedings and advised the Commission. In the rehearing he served as
a witness for the staff. The prepared testimony indicates that he did more than generally
review exhibits and comments: he also observed fish hatchery operations and hydraulic
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After the conclusion of the hearing and the submission of briefs by
staff counsel and parties, the hearing examiner makes an initial de.
cision. The case then goes before the agency, a five-man body con-
sisting of the chairman and four commissioners. Oral argument is
heard only when a majority of the Commission so orders. 0 Relying
on the siftings of their personal assistants and the Office of Special
Assistants, as well as advice from any experts not previously involved,
they arrive at a decision and announce an order in the case.
II. Commission and Staff Initiative
A. The Commission: Practice and Potential
The FPC can initiate protection of non-power interests in several
ways. First, it can further encourage the applicants themselves to pro-
mote recreation and protect fish and wildlife by requiring them to
include more non-power materials with their applications. Along these
lines, the Commission in 1967 proclaimed "its intention to consider
air-pollution and conservation factors in all of the various licensing
and other actions that it takes."8 0 To implement this new policy, the
agency should require applicants to submit an aesthetics exhibit and
an air pollution exhibit whenever relevant.81 Such exhibits can help
the applicant. For example, in the Scenic Hudson case Con Edison
could demonstrate the inconspicuousness of an underground plant
and transmission lines, as well as the mitigating effect on Manhattan
air pollution stemming from the company's new ability to close down
thermal plants in the New York City area.
A second area of initiative available to the Commission is increased
supervision of the legal staff to insure its uniformly aggressive protec-
tion of non-power interests in the preparation of each case. Because
of the rule against ex parte communications,3 2 the Commission can
exercise no direct control over the staff on the issues they discuss, the
studies they request, and the positions they take. Instead, the Coin-
model operations, and reviewed preliminary reports of studies made by a private
biological research company.
29. Interview with Carl Bagge, Commissioner, Federal Power Commission, in Washing.
ton, D.C., Oct. 7, 1966.
30. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1967, at 119, col. 4.
31. The applicant would undertake the studies, involving, in the case of aesthetics,
geological surveys and architectural studies of traditional and landscape varieties. The
applicant should try to preserve the natural beauty of the area by making projects
inconspicuous, if that is appropriate, and by refurbishing any natural aspects he damages
during construction. In addition, the applicant could include plans for beautification of
areas in the project vicinity that need rehabilitation.
32. 18 C.F.RL § 1.4(d) (1963).
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mission must resort to manipulation of the hearing order to guide the
staff presentation. The present broad open-ended order should be
retained: limiting the scope of the hearing would prejudge the case
to the extent that it precluded investigation of potentially decisive
issues. But the Commission should also specify issues for considera-
tion which it feels the staff might otherwise neglect1
If the initial hearing-order effort to guide the staff counsel toward
affirmative protection of non-power interests is ineffective and the
hearing record reaches the FPC with a gap, the Commission should
remand to force the staff to present additional evidence. However, the
agency has rarely remanded for further consideration of non-power
factors.34 Such a failure represents both a neglected opportunity to
oversee the staff and a prejudgment of the application, since ex
hypothesi the conservation evidence that the Commission must ex-
amine before granting the license is not all in yet. In the first round
of Scenic Hudson, the Commission refused to remand when it initially
granted Con Edison its license; instead, after awarding the license it
returned the case to the examiner "for the introduction of additional
evidence in regard solely to the overhead transmission facilities beyond
Nelsonville and the design of the fish protective facilities of the
project."35 The narrowness of the remand order precluded inquiry into
both the cost of underground transmission lines from the project site
to Nelsonville and the question whether, given the nature of the
installation, any fish protective facilities could be adequate. The result
was a decision made with crucial gaps in the record. On appeal before
the Second Circuit, the Commission argued that the license grant
followed by limited remand was a frequently-followed agency proce-
dure. The court was unimpressed; it held that the inquiry into under-
ground transmission was inadequate and ordered the Commission to
"take the whole fisheries question into consideration before deciding
whether the Storm King project is licensed." 30
The agency followed a somewhat similar course in High Mountain
Sheep, with strikingly similar results. After the hearing had dosed and
33. The Commission cannot know prior to the hearing what issues will be relevant, or
even crucial, to the final determination. Therefore, in listing issues for investigation, it
should refrain from setting boundaries or implying that the staff fulfills its function once
it deals with the specified questions.
34. According to Commissioner Bagge, only one such remand has occurred during his
tenure, and that decision dealt with gas conservation in a natural gas case. Interview vith
Carl Bagge, Commissioner, Federal Power Commission, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 7,
1966.
35. Consolidated Edison Co., 33 F.P.C. 428, 457 (1965).
36. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1965).
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the examiner had rendered his decision, the Secretary of the Interior
petitioned to intervene to demonstrate the preferability of federal to
private development. The FPC limited intervention by the Secretary
to filing exceptions to the initial decision and participating in oral
argument, and then opted for private development. The Secretary
petitioned for a rehearing, asking that the record be opened to permit
him to correct the evidentiary deficiencies concerning the desirability
of federal development. The Commission granted the rehearing but
did not reopen the record, and it shortly reaffirmed its original de-
cision. The Supreme Court held that such a procedure violated the
agency's statutory responsibility to disapprove private, municipal, and
state applications when it finds that the United States itself should
undertake development.
The issue of federal development has never been explored in
this record. The applicants introduced no evidence addressed to
that question; and the Commission denied the Secretary an op-
portunity to do so though his application was timely. The issue
was of course briefed and argued; yet no factual inquiry was
undertaken. . . . The Commission by its ruling on the applica-
tions of the Secretary to intervene and to reopen precluded it
from having the informed judgment that [the statute] com-
mands.37
The judicial responses in the Supreme Court and Second Circuit
suggest that henceforth in cases where staff counsel and the parties
have failed to build a complete record on the non-power issues, the
Commission should remand to fill the gaps before awarding the license,
rather than grant a license and then re-open the record for hearings
on the non-power issues. Since the Commission must weigh power
benefits against conservationist losses in deciding whether to grant a
license, its balancing operation is bound to be unsatisfactory when it
lacks adequate evidence to place on the non-power side of the scales.
In some cases-such as with high dams, where no devices presently
exist to protect the fish life-the Commission faces a stark either-or
choice.38 Here the failure to require adequate non-power evidence on
the record can mean only that the agency has answered its basic ques-
tion before it formally got around to asking it; remanding for non-
37. Udall v. FPC, 887 U.S. 428, 434 (1967).
38. In Hell's Canyon, for example, technology has not yet solved this problem. Inter-
view with Joseph Swidler, former Chairman, Federal Power Commission, In Washington,
D.C., Oct. 27, 1966. But the agency may deal with such problems by recourse to fish
hatcheries and transportation of fingerlings around the dams.
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power evidence after granting the license is no more than a crust
thrown to the conservationist elements.
Thus, by deciding to license before completing the record in Scenic
Hudson, the agency came close to making irrebuttable presumptions
that fish could be protected after completion of the project, and that
the cost of underground transmission lines automatically outweighed
aesthetic considerations. In High Mountain Sheep, the Commission
acted similarly by refusing to reopen the record after its initial licens-
ing and thereby preduding the Interior Secretary from substantiating
his arguments with evidence. Such presumptions may eliminate the
inconvenience of an open-ended remand with the basic license ques-
tion still unresolved; but they also engender defective decisions and
re-remands required by appellate court reversals of the Commission.
Although a policy of remanding before licensing should prevent
decisions based on incomplete records, it will not alone ensure force-
ful staff representation of non-power interests.ro Where habits in pre-
senting cases have worn deeply over the years into well-rutted grooves,
staff inertia may be difficult to uproot. To the extent that participation
by conservationist intervenors increases, agency lawyers may be tempted
to rely on such third parties to fill in the record gaps they have left
open.
The ex parte rules limit direct communications between the Com-
mission and staff, but much can be done within the bounds of propriety
to encourage staff advocacy of non-power interests. One commissioner
has suggested that the memoranda that "flow all over the place" keep
everybody informed of the Commission's views.4 0 More formally, the
Commission may promulgate "housekeeping" rules or instruct the
General Counsel to inform staff counsel that they are expected to
present a complete affirmative non-power case, regardless of the pres-
ence or vigor of intervenors. In addition, the Commission can authorize
the hearing examiners to require staff counsel and parties to present
additional evidence on non-power issues.Y
A third opportunity for Commission initiative in protecting non-
power interests lies in the area of river basin planning. In 1963, to
39. The Commission could remand as a sanction against the staff in cases where in-
tervenors had already entered to fill gaps in the record. But the procedure would be in-
efficient, and the non-power parties, who have already borne the burden of presenting their
case, would receive little benefit.
40. Interview with John Carver, Jr., Commissioner, Federal Power Commission, in
Washington, D.C., Oct. 28, 1966.
41. 18 C.F.R § 1.20(j) (1967).
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discharge its statutory responsibility for ensuring that its licensing
activities will "advance the development of the Nation's river basins
on the most effective and comprehensive basis," the FPC started a
program of water resource appraisals for hydroelectric licensing.'"
By 1965 the Commission had completed Planning Status Reports for
nearly 40 per cent of the country's river basins; for the rest it lacked
sufficient information to determine whether present and potential
projects are compatible with a comprehensive plan for development
of the basin's resources. Where adequate plans are not available for
basins the Commission must deal with in coming years, the agency
itself prepares the basin studies. What test the FPC currently uses to
determine the "adequacy" of existing plans is unclear, but the test
should thoroughly canvass non-power aspects. Where non-FPC plans
have given insufficient consideration to conservationist aspects dic-
tating that development should be limited or prevented, the FPC
should formulate appropriate plans.
In addition, the Commission should consider each application in the
context of all other potential development of the basin. In Scenic
Hudson, it was common knowledge that the Central Hudson Power
Company was planning to apply for a project in the Highlands, but
the Commission declined to consider other potential development in
the area when it passed on the Con Edison application.43
B. The Staff: Initiative, Evaluation and Coordination
1. Staff Counsel. Because of the severe handicaps under which
conservationist groups operate, the staff counsel must protect non-
power interests more actively than he now does if they are to receive
consistent and effective representation. By virtue of his position as
42. 1965 FPC AN. REP, 80.
43. Several other avenues are available for Commission initiative in the protection of
non-power interests. Chairman White has enumerated several tasks the agency has under-
taken or is contemplating: (1) a "priorities system" for authorizing "superior uses," e.g., a
reservoir for strictly recreational purposes with compensation to licensees suffering loss; (2)
research on placing transmission lines underground and finding better locations for
them, with supporting testimony on behalf of enabling legislation before the Senate
Commerce Committee; (3) similar testimony on air-pollution legislation, primarily
in connection with the natural-gas jurisdiction of the agency; (4) testimony on legislation
concerning the location of steam plants on rivers and the thermal impact on fish ecology
of the river. Interview with Lee White, Chairman, Federal Power Commission, in Wash-
ington, D.C., Oct. 28, 1966.
Commissioner Ross adds that the "recapture" provisions of the Federal Power Act
provide an opportunity for furthering non-power goals, because the power companies
must show a high degree of social responsibility if they are to be relicensed rather than
see their projects taken over by the government. Interview with Charles Ross, Commis
sioner, Federal Power Commission, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 28, 1966.
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chief coordinator in the early stages of license application and as
agency spokesman at the formal hearing, the staff lawyer plays a cen-
tral role. His non-power responsibilities should commence at the in-
formal negotiations, where he has great leverage to draw concessions
from the applicant.
After the decisions in Scenic Hudson and High Mountain Sheep,
it is clear that staff counsel cannot leave the non-power parties to make
their own case at the hearing. The Commission cannot comply with
the appellate courts' instructions to provide active and affirmative
protection for third-party interests if agency counsel leave the presenta-
tion of non-power materials to the happenstance of third-party inter-
vention. And if the applicant and conservationist intervenors offer
conflicting evidence, it is imperative that the staff counsel dearly pre-
sent his own conclusions and supporting evidence to the hearing
examiner.4
2. Non-Power Staff. The biggest problem for the Section of Recre-
ation, Fish, and Wildlife is its small size and meager budget. One com-
missioner admits that the Section appropriation is small, but argues
that other areas have higher priorities;"6 another would limit expan-
sion, because he wants to keep the Section "taut," and therefore
"'effective."46 A third commissioner thinks that with some expansion
the Section could force the applicant power companies to do much
of the work through the exhibit requirements; the power companies
usually have the computer facilities-which the Commission lacks-
to run the necessary cost-benefit analyses on the non-power issues. 47
The disadvantages of such reliance upon the "private sector" are ob-
44. The prepared testimony submitted by staff counsel prior to the Scenic Hudson
rehearing failed to reflect the spirit of the remand. The staff case contained evidence on
alternatives to the Storm King project, but very little testimony on the wider range of
non-power questions involved in the application. The agency's non-power testimony camefrom the Commission's own fish expert and an air pollution expert from the PublicHealth Service. Left untouched were many of the geological, aesthetic, and other non-
power issues raised by Scenic Hudson's witnesses. F. Hauck, Prepared Testimony before the
FPC, Oct. 19, 1966 (on file in Yale Law Library; to be incorporated in Record, Consolidated
Edison Co., 3 F.P.C. 428 (1965)). Still, counsel arguably acted within the letter of the
remand, since the Second Circuit had not specified the latter issues for further inquiry.
The staff counsel demonstrated his leaning toward traditional power interests early in
the rehearing when, in response to several objections by the attorney for one of the
conservationist organizations, he remarked that the utilities "have to have real temerity
these days in view of the opposition of the Sierra Club." N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 196, at s6,
col. 4.
45. Interview with Lee White, Chairman, Federal Power Commission, in Washington,
D.C., Oct. 28, 1966.
46. Interview with Joseph Swidler, former Chairman, Federal Power Commission, in
Washington, D.C., Oct. 27, 1966.
47. Interview with Charles Ross, Commissioner, Federal Power Commission, in
Washington, D.C., Oct. 28, 1966.
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vious: the Commission must depend on the applicant to produce an
impartial study that the Section may later want to use to modify or
even defeat the license request.
Aside from the power companies, the Section can turn only to the
other governmental agencies, state and federal, with which the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act requires it to consult.48 Reliance on
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of In-
terior is the most frequent; it also raises the most problems. The
exhibits coming in to the Section go to the Assistant Secretary of
the Interior for Water Resources; they then pass through the relevant
Interior agencies where, according to one former Interior staff mem-
ber, they receive little, if any, coordinated attention.4 9
Even if the Section's passive role-heavy reliance on other agencies
to spot detailed issues, and exclusive reliance on them for the neces-
sary studies-is appropriate, the staff still needs more people to
identify important questions and to evaluate the broad non-power
information theoretically coming to the Commission. The FPC should
expand the Section, perhaps to include a city planner for the emerging
problems of transmission lines in populated areas, a geologist to study
project effects on natural formations, an air-pollution specialist to
analyze mitigating effects of comprehensive plans, and a regional and
river-basin planner to co-ordinate conservationist efforts.
With a larger staff in each of the areas, the Section could function
more aggressively by initiating and supervising relevant studies con-
ducted independently by FPC-designated research organizations and
financed by the applicant. 0 The Section might thereby develop stan-
dards and criteria for other non-power areas at a practicable cost to
the Commission.
III. Maximizing Public Participation
Although the conservationist groups lack money and manpower,
particularly in comparison with the power companies, the Commis-
48. 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1958).
49. Interview with former staff member, Department of Interior, in Washington, D.C.,
Oct. 6, 1966.
Due to a manpower shortage, the Interior staff assigned to process the forms is often
inadequate to the task. The result usually is a substantial delay in rendering final
decisions. Interview with a Federal Power Commission official, in Washington, D.C., Oct.,
1966.
50. The applicant, after all, is requesting a valuable natural resource from the govern-
ment and should be willing to finance the processing of the application. Once successful,
he can normally include the added cost in his rate base; the only injury he ain suffer
will come from the competitive market at the hands of other power sources.
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sion can do much to redress the existing imbalance of private forces.
The agency should re-examine its contacts with the public, with a view
toward facilitating participation by private non-power groups in the
licensing process.
A. Intervention
The Federal Power Act permits liberal intervention, and the FP0
generally recognizes the right of organizations representing non-power
interests to intervene in licensing cases. In the Scenic Hudson case,
though, even while the agency was admitting some organizations that
had filed petitions more than a year after the formal deadline had
elapsed, it excluded fish groups whose evidence the court of appeals
later thought would be crucial.5 ' Since the reversal, the Commission
has taken no chances: it has thrown its doors open to groups filing too
late in the original hearing, and to others now seeking to intervene for
the first time.52
The Commission could formalize its liberalized intervention policy
by promulgating a rule that it will admit as a matter of right specified
types of non-power interest groups such as conservation and recrea-
tional organizations. Codifying present policy will leave it less suscepti-
ble than will unwritten guidelines to later change after a turnover in
personnel. The new policy should have only a minimal impact upon
administrative efficiency: the cost of intervention is sufficiently great to
deter would-be participants except in the few cases that already have
great notoriety; and even there, as the proceedings drag on, the num-
ber of third-party representatives tends to diminish sharply.0
B. Notice
Once the Commission receives a license application, the Federal
Power Act requires it to publish notice in a local newspaper once a
week for four weeks.54 In Scenic Hudson the agency complied with the
letter of the law, giving statutory notice four times in one month in
51. See 354 F.2d 608, 623-24 (2d Cir. 1965).
52. FPC, Order Fixing Hearing on Remand, Jan. 25, 1956 (on file in Yale Law Librar)y
to be incorporated in Record, Consolidated Edison Co., 33 F.P.C. 428 (1965)). By the
rehearing in November, 1966, the agency had admitted more than eighty parties. The
range of interests represented was also great, including counties, towns, individuals gun
clubs, labor unions, national and local conservation groups, and a chamber of commerce.
53. In late January, 1967, the conservation interests were represented at the rehearing
by only three attorneys; the length of the hearing was attributable to its thoroughness,
rather than to the number of parties involved. The rehearing had opened the preceding
November with more than fifty lawyers in attendance.
54. Federal Power Act § 4(f), 16 US.C. § 797(f) (1964).
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the Independent Republican of Goshen (N.Y.).5 Not surprisingly, few
of the conservation organizations learned of the Con Edison applica-
tion by perusing the notice columns of the Goshen Republican. One
of the founders of the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference reports
that he first heard of the Storm King project from an undisclosed
party-perhaps an insider at the FPC-who telephoned to tell him of
the license bid and impending hearing. 0 After the Second Circuit
reversed the agency's initial decision, the Commission mended its
ways: to its roster of once-a-week-for-four-weeks newspapers, it added
The New York Times and the Putnam County Courier (Carmel,
N.Y.). 57
The FPC's recourse to a Manhattan daily shows that the Commis-
sion does not regard the statute as a barrier to expanded notice. By
the same token, the Commission should cease to regard the statutory
standard as a goal. It is a minimal demand on the agency that it inform
the groups the statute recognizes as interested parties of the pendency
of an application. 8
Conservation organizations and other non-power groups operating
on a regional or national level are unlikely to receive notice from
either local or metropolitan newspapers. For them the Federal Regis-
ter, spewing forth its daily mass of undigested materials, is also useless.
The appropriate solution is a permanent FPC mailing list of individ-
uals and organizations interested in licensing determinations. The
agency already has one, but its existence is not well known. Broader
listing will secure conservationists an initial notice of license applica-
tions, with details of project size, location, and facilities. If interested,
the recipient will request listing on a mailing circular for the given
project. The proposed solution achieves widespread notice at an early
55. FPC, Presiding Examiner's Initial Decision Upon Application for a License for a
Hydroelectric Project, July 31, 1964, at 2 (on file in Yale Law Library; to be incorporated
in Record, Consolidated Edison Co., 33 F.P.C. 428 (1965)).
56. The founder then made contact with Washington counsel, who filed a petition to
intervene some nine months after the deadline had passed. Although the Commission did
permit late entry, Scenic Hudson's tardiness put it at a distinct disadvantage in preparing
its case. Interview with Dr. Walter Boardman, former Executive Director, Nature Con-
servancy, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 27, 1966.
57. Proof of Publication of Notice of Application Amendment, Aug. 1, 1966 (on file In
Yale Law Library; to be incorporated in Record, Consolidated Edison Co., 33 F.P.C. 428(1965)).
58. As a start, the FPC should publish notice in every issue of relevant local papers,
even if they appear more frequently than once a week. Notice given over a four-week
period should suffice to inform local residents if published in a daily paper, but the
Commission should resort to longer periods to insure equivalent exposure where publica-
tion is less frequent than daily. Since citizens of the immediate area may not be the only
ones interested in the proceedings, notice must also reach interested parties in other areas
through publication in widely circulating newspapers of the region.
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stage, with no burden on the Commission to keep people informed
who have no interest in a particular proceeding. At the same time, it
gives interested parties access to further information without delaying
what is already a slow and cumbersome process.
The costs of expanded newspaper notice and a national mailing list
are not significant in themselves. The reforms can be counted on to
increase long-run efficiency. By insuring effective and early notice,
they should minimize late interventions and consequent delay, and by
ensuring the airing of all relevant issues, reduce the likelihood of a
remand by the Commission or a reversal by an appellate court.
C. Negotiation
The informal pre-hearing conferences between staff and applicant
may lead to agreement on relevant non-power issues in the absence
of conservationist advocates, who get their day in court only at a pro
forma hearing where the major questions have already been settled.
The FPC should therefore allow non-power organizations a role as
early as possible in the proceedings, and preferably in the informal
negotiations. A standing committee, representing the relevant national
organizations, would best serve the purpose. The committee could
join as a matter of right in the bargaining process at its inception, with
its primary function the prevention of adverse concessions by the
staff before interested groups have a chance to form and intervene.
The committee would have no veto power, because nothing is formally
decided at this stage; instead, it would serve as a third party in the
process to whom the others might pay attention, if only because con-
tinued presence in the same room makes compatibility a prerequisite
of survival.59 The committee device, of course, in no way lessens the
need for the formal hearing. Existing organizations should still have
the opportunity to present their diverse and often divergent views in
the proceedings.
D. Clarifying the Rule Book
The Scenic Hudson experience demonstrated that non-power groups
share a profound and widespread ignorance of the FPC process. c  One
59. It would serve no purpose to grant the committee a veto power, since neither the
hearing examiner nor the Commission is involved at the pre.hearing stage. In addition,
staff attorneys and applicants could easily evade such a veto power by recourne to tacit or
secret agreements.
60. The protest letters received by the Commission indicate the extent of the ignorance.
Hundreds of letters merely opposed the grant'of a license to Con Edison, without indicat-
ing a desire to play a further role in the proceeding. Those few indicating a desire for
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Washington, D.C., conservationist who spoke to the major conserva-
tionist organizations concluded that they were all "babes in the woods"
when it came to understanding the agency's ground rules.01 Tradi-
tionally they reacted to projects like Storm King by writing their con-
gressmen, the Secretary of the Interior, and the FPC, unaware that
other avenues were open to them for protest.
The Commission practice in responding to a letter from someone
obviously interested in the case is to inform the writer of his statutory
right to intervene.6 2 But the form answer to general objections does
not call attention to the right. The agency's replies to inquiries and
protests in Scenic Hudson ranged from a variety of form letters to
semi-personalized responses, all assuring the addressee that the Com-
mission was aware of its function and was considering all the relevant
factors. In answering specific questions about the right to take part in
the proceedings and how to go about it, the Commission frequently
mailed a copy of its highly technical Rules of Practice and Procedure,
referring the reader to relevant sections on intervention. In all cases
the agency roused itself only to minimal efforts, volunteering no in-
formation not specifically requested and speaking in the complicated
language of its rule book. None of these practices is calculated to
endear the Commission to either outside groups seeking useful infor-
mation or appellate judges reviewing license grants.
The FPC can begin reform by explaining rights under the rules and
statutes to all who write in with objections.03 The explanation could
come in the form of a manual or handbook complete enough to in-
form the inquirer of the options open to him and intelligible enough
for him to understand it.
E. Protest Letters
Protest letters present a further ground for criticism of FPC practice.
The Commission senses their relevance but treats them haphazardly,
further involvement frequently expressed or displayed confusion on just what the authors
should do.
Even those usually familiar with the rules of the game in Congress are unaware of FPC
procedures. A lobbyist for the Colorado Hiking Club in the Bridge Canyon.Marble
Canyon controversy, having won a temporary victory on Capitol Hill, was forced to go to
the FPC to ask what to do next. She had no knowledge of the agency's procedures and did
not realize that a right to intervene existed.
61. Interview with Dr. Walter Boardman, former Executive Director, Nature Con-
servancy, in Washington, D.C., Oct. 27, 1966.
62. Interview with Charles Ross, Commissioner, Federal Power Commission, In
Washington, D.C., Oct. 28, 1966.
63. This information could also be sent to the individuals and organizations on the
permanent mailing lists. See p. 132 supra.
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and it has neither officially recognized nor explained their significance.
Some of the commissioners see some of the letters--the ones fortui-
tously addressed to them; none of the commissioners sees all the mail,
or even a random sample. To avoid such an unsystematic gauging of
public sentiment, the agency should either adhere strictly to the letter
of its rule against ex parte communications," or should regularize the
procedure by putting the letters in the record. The latter course might
provide a relatively reliable measure of the public pulse as well as help
to maximize public participation."5
The anomalous handling of the mail is underscored by the current
practice of allowing "statements of position" at the hearing. The
statements become part of the record, although they are neither given
under oath nor subject to cross-examination. The only difference be-
tween the statement and the simple protest letter is that the former
costs more: its author must either deliver it personally at the hearing
or hire a lawyer to read it for him.
F. Conduct of Hearing
Conservationist intervenors, as well as license applicants, are handi-
capped by the current practice under which the staff counsel presents
his position for the first time in the brief he submits at the close of
the hearing, when it is too late for the parties to present witnesses in
rebuttal. To allow all participants a fair opportunity to meet the argu-
ments of each of the others, the present procedure should be revised
to require timely presentation of the agency's views of the problems
that require full canvassing.
IV. External Agencies
Even with increased FPG initiative on behalf of non-power interests
and expanded public participation in the Commission's processes, the
64. 18 C.F.R. § 1.4(d) (1967).
65. In addition to increasing public participation in the decision-making process, the
inclusion would provide the agency with useful information. Despite its considerable
insulation, the FPC is a policy-making institution which should be concerned with
"reading the mail" and resorting to it to some extent in riding the political tide. The
public-mail factor is not likely to be decisive in the ultimate decision, but it does aid the
Commission in evaluating non-power losses by indicating public use, present and potential,
of resources to be damaged or destroyed. Keeping track of the mail could also assist the
agency in determining the specific license conditions needed to minimize losses. Further-
more, letters as additions to the record would help insure coverage of the relevant issues
at the hearing, and thus aid both the hearing examiner and the Commis ion in their
respective decisions whether to require further evidence and whether to remand to com-
plete the record before licensing. The cost of such a procedure would be minimal: that of
printing the letters in the record. Since the parties already receive copies of the record,
serving the individual letters on them would be unnecessary.
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basic problem remains the agency's involvement with the industry it
regulates and its natural desire to foster development of good eco-
nomic projects and a rapid expansion in the industry. The Commission
could use outside help in "determining without bias whether a power
development should be constructed" in the first place. As Commis-
sioner Ross has noted, "The Commission's right to condition licenses
... oftentimes obscure[s] the fundamental issue whether our national
heritage of historic sites and natural beauty requires any development
at all."66
At present, external assistance consists of intervention by other
agencies, primarily the Department of Interior, and the occasional use
of outside expert witnesses. In the past, formal intervention by Interior
has been of little value in protecting non-power interests because of the
split within the Department itself between its conservation sections and
the Bureau of Reclamation (often called a dam-building machine). At
the FPC hearing, Interior may urge denial of the sought-for license
only because Reclamation wants to build the dam itself, rather than
from any conservationist instinct. As a result, the FPC views Interior
as just another pressure group out to protect its own interests. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has indicated that the FPC may have to take
another look at Interior as a potential representative of conservationist
interests. In High Mountain Sheep, the Court has carved out a special
role for the Secretary of the Interior in protecting non-power interests
before the FPC.
[T]he Secretary by reason of § 2 of the [Anadromous Fish] Act
comes to the Federal Power Commission with a special mandate
from Congress, a mandate that gives him special standing to ap-
pear, to intervene, to introduce evidence on the proposed river
development program, and to participate fully in the administra-
tive proceedings.0T
Recently the Commission has come increasingly to seek expert
witnesses from other agencies. In the Scenic Hudson rehearing, the
,agency drew on atomic-power and air-pollution authorities from the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Health, Education
66. C. Ross, Separate Comments on H.R. 13508, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., n.d. (on file In
Yale Law Library), at 2 (1966).
67. 887 U.S. 428, 439-40 (1967). The Court's reliance on Interior may be somewhat
naive, in view of the institutionalized division of interests within that Department. A true
Interior fulfillment of the High Mountain Sheep mandate would require a separation of
the two major interests inside the agency to establish an effective check on FPC inclina.
tions. Such a scheme would entitle the conservation wing to great weight as an intervenor,
its argument for non-development or severe restrictions might often carry the day.
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and Welfare. The Commission should expand the practice, despite tie
reluctance of some experts to present oral testimony which must be
supported by evidence and defended under cross-examination.
The Commission should also consider other potential external
checks to insure more effective non-power protection. For one thing,
the agency can yield to state legislative establishment of state parks in
potential power areas. Commissioner Ross suggested such an approach
in the Scenic Hudson case, although he declined to recommend it as a
general procedure. 68 Chairman Swidler, however, disagreed: "Such an
indefinite postponement would in effect be a denial of Con Edison's
application without a hearing and would be contrary to our obligation
under the Federal Power Act to decide the case."'69 The present Chair-
man, Lee White, recognizes the absence of any express statutory bar
to holding a decision in abeyance until another agency has had a chance
to act, but he feels that the Commission has an obligation to render
prompt decisions.70 Still, nothing prevents the FPC from giving the
legislatures an opportunity to express themselves, through immediate
notice of applications to affected states and postponements of licensing
proceedings when appropriate. The case for immediacy in license
processing is almost never sound; if a site has lain dormant for over
fifty years, another year or two to explore the issue will seldom prove
fatal to the project.
In High Mountain Sheep, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
68. 33 F.P.C. 428, 461 (1965) (separate opinion). Ross argued that the Commission
should withhold its decision for one year to give New York an opportunity to declare the
"Hudson Highlands" a state park, in which case the FPC would probably refuse to license
within the area.
69. Letter from Joseph Swidler to Chauncey Stillman, Dec., 1964, on file at the Federal
Power Commission.
70. Interview with Lee White, Chairman, Federal Power Commission, in Washington.
D.C., Oct. 28, 1966. During the Scenic Hudson rehearing, the Commission refused to stay
the proceedings to allow for establishment of an interstate compact under the Ottinger
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-605, 80 Stat. 847 (1966); the agency argued that the Act neither re-
quired nor suggested a Commission moratorium, but merely stipulated FPC consultation
with the Secretary of the Interior prior to any agency action affecting the Hudson river-
way. Section 1 of the Act provides:
[]t is the sense of the Congress that Federal departments and agencies should,
insofar as possible, consider the effect of projects or actions upon achievement of the
objectives of this Act until the compact has been acted upon by the States and the
Federal Government.
The Commission conceded that the section applied, but insisted that "consideration must
be made on the merits on the basis of the hearing record in the proceeding. Postponement
would serve no useful purpose in aid of that determination or in the discharge of our
responsibilities under the Federal Power Act."
FPC, Order Denying Motion for Stay, Jan. 17, 1967 (on file in Yale Law Library; to be
incorporated in Record, Consolidated Edison Co., 33 F.P.C. 428 (1965)). By refusing to
hold the proceeding in abeyance, the FPC of course had not eliminated the alternative of
deferring completely to the state of New York by refusing to license projects on the
Hudson riverway in the first place.
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FPC has an affirmative duty, in some circumstances, to defer licensing
pending a determination
whether deferral of construction would be more in the public
interest than immediate construction and whether preservation
of the reaches of the river affected would be more desirable and
in the public interest than the proposed development . . . . We
cannot assume that the Act commands the immediate construction
of as many projects as possible.71
In all its proceedings and deliberations, the FPG would do well to
reflect that river basins are a limited and irreplaceable resource, while
alternative power supplies are increasing to the point that hydro-
electric power may soon be obsolete. The Supreme Court in High
Mountain Sheep intimated that it regarded the advent of atomic power
as justifying a decline in the rate of dam-building activity.72 Still,
short of a general going-out-of-business sale, the FPC can, it is clear, do
much at the procedural level to strengthen the non-power interests at
stake in the hydroelectric licensing process.
71. 387 U.S. 428, 449 (1967).
72. Id. at 444-48.
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